Language's role in enabling abstract, logical thought by Hampton, J. A.
Hampton, J. A. (2002). Language's role in enabling abstract, logical thought. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 25(6), 688 - 688.
City Research Online
Original citation: Hampton, J. A. (2002). Language's role in enabling abstract, logical thought. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 688 - 688.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/940/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Language’s role in enabling abstract, 
logical thought
James A. Hampton
Psychology Department, City University (London), London EC1V OHB, UK.
hampton@city.ac.uk http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/hampton
Abstract: Carruthers’s thesis is undermined on the one hand by examples
of integration of output from domain-specific modules that are indepen-
dent of language, and on the other hand by examples of linguistically rep-
resented thoughts that are unable to integrate different domain-specific
knowledge into a coherent whole. I propose a more traditional role for lan-
guage in thought as providing the basis for the cultural development and
transmission of domain-general abstract knowledge and reasoning skills.
What is the role of language in thought? Carruthers claims that
thought originally developed in prelinguistic hominids and other
mammals within domain specific modules such as a folk biology,
folk physics, or folk psychology, and that the evolution of language
was necessary for integrating the outputs of these modules and so
enabling humans to be more intelligent and adaptive. I take issue
with the thesis on four grounds.
First, it is unclear why language should be considered necessary
for integrating the outputs from different domain-specific mod-
ules. The evidence cited by Carruthers is very limited for such a
general claim. There are clearly unfamiliar situations in which be-
ing able to use verbal coding and inner speech will make infor-
mation of different kinds easier to integrate, recall, and use, but
that does not provide evidence that we cannot easily integrate in-
formation from different domains without language in many fa-
miliar contexts. When attempting to tackle an opponent in rugby
or football, or when selecting a shot to play in tennis, the athlete
needs to be able to integrate psychological reasoning about the
likely action about to be taken by the other player with physical in-
formation about the speed and direction in which both players
and/or the ball are travelling. It is an empirical question whether
inner speech might play some role here, but it seems unlikely to
be necessary for integration, given that reaction times are much
too quick to allow verbally mediated conscious deliberation.
Second, it is important to note (although Carruthers does not
claim to the contrary) that language may often be insufficient to
ensure integration across domains. Although we have a well-es-
tablished vocabulary with which to talk about psychology and
physics, the two domains stubbornly resist attempts to integrate
their outputs in any known form of language, even for experts. So
a psychiatrist may feel warranted to tell her patient that there is
“nothing physically wrong with you,” and then proceed to suc-
cessfully treat the “purely psychological” symptoms with a drug
known to affect physical systems in the brain. Cartesian dualism is
probably the most widely held commonsense view of the mind-
body relation, and the philosophical problems of integrating the
output from the two forms of discourse are notorious.
The failure of language to achieve integration may also be found
between folk biology and folk physics, with commonsense beliefs
in animism holding for many centuries and still demonstrable in
children before exposure to science education. There are also
many domain effects in reasoning. Tasks of logical reasoning such
as Wason’s (in)famous four-card problem are very difficult in the
abstract, but can be made trivially easy if placed in a domain where
the structure of the domain lends meaning to the problem. If lan-
guage is successful at facilitating domain-general thinking, then an
account is needed of why the task (which is presented entirely in
linguistic terms) should become so much harder when abstracted
away from a specific domain.
Third, the thesis ignores what may be a much more crucial role
for language to play in thought, namely, abstraction (see, e.g., the
early research of Bruner et al. 1966). More recently Barsalou
(1999) has developed the thesis that (broadly speaking) concepts
are mental simulations. Tokening a thought with a particular con-
ceptual content leads to (and may even just be) activation of sen-
sory and motor schemas associated with perception and action re-
lated to that concept. If his thesis is true, then thinking will oper-
ate most successfully within a modality-specific and situated form
of mental model. I would argue that a key function of language is
that it provides an escape from this primary level of thought. It
provides the bridge between the “messy” prototype representa-
tion of a concept built around experience and action in the world
and the “clean” representation of a concept as an encapsulated
atom (see, e.g., Fodor 1998). Fodor’s arguments for conceptual
atomism involve the compositionality and systematicity of thought.
Yet these arguments themselves are simply derived from earlier
considerations of the compositionality and systematicity of lan-
guage. Language allows us to abstract out a notion of a concept
from the individual experiences on which it is based. It creates a
new mental “entity” as a reified object of thought. As Dwight
Bolinger put it, “The act of naming, with all we have seen it to im-
ply in the way of solidifying and objectifying experience, becomes
one of our most powerful suasive tools, enabling us to create en-
tities practically out of nothing” (Bolinger 1975, p. 251).
Finally, I argue that a second crucial cognitive role for language
is as a necessary precursor for the cultural development of socially
shared logical thinking and hence, for rationality, narrowly de-
fined. Natural language is, of course, a very imperfect tool for ex-
pressing truths of any kind because of the vagueness to be found
in almost all of its referring expressions and the ambiguity in much
of its syntax. However, once the reference of terms is established
(e.g., by indexicals or stipulation), and care is taken in choice of
syntactic form, the development of logic (and hence mathematics
and science) can proceed, using forms of propositional argument
based on the sentences of natural language. The formation of a
community of speakers sharing the same language has therefore
been essential for the progression of human thought through the
formulation and the resolution of conflicting views.
In a sense, of course, abstract logical thinking performs the
function of taking input from domain-specific modules and inte-
grating them, just as Carruthers argues. But it is not the availabil-
ity of language per se that lies at the basis of this integration. There
are many examples of domain-specific knowledge that signally fail
to be integrated in spite of fully developed language structures for
talking about them. It is rather the fact that with language – and
the cultural development and transmission of knowledge that it
supports – comes the hard-won capacity for abstracting the form
of an argument away from its content, developing general reason-
ing skills and finding the means for testing and challenging the
reasoning of others.
Relativistic implications of a natural-
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Abstract: I will argue (contra Carruthers) that accepting natural language
as the format of many of our thoughts should entail accepting a version of
Whorfian relativism and that, rather than something to be avoided, evi-
dence from bilingual cognition suggests that incorporating this idea into
future research would yield further insights into the cognitive functions of
natural language.
Peter Carruthers’s work on the cognitive functions of language is
an excellent example of the healthy symbiosis of philosophy and
psychology. Carruthers’s work in this area has matured in response
to empirical evidence from scientific psychology (cf. Carruthers
1996, where no clear theory of central cognitive modules is pre-
sented, with Carruthers 1998 and subsequent work) and, at the
same time, Carruthers has injected a philosopher’s objectivity into
the debate and has pointed out important new areas for research.
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